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‘A Great Turkish Policy’: Winston Churchill,
the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the
Dardanelles Campaign
A. WARREN DOCKTER
Aberystwyth University
Abstract
One of the most important players in British/Ottoman relations and the ultimate
breakdown of those relations during the Edwardian period and war years was Winston
Churchill. Diplomatic historians and Churchill biographers have focused on Churchill’s
role in the attempted naval conquest of the Dardanelles, the unsuccessful Gallipoli
campaign and Churchill’s wartime disdain for the Ottomans. In doing so, they tend to
portrayChurchill’s relationshipwith theOttoman empire in a negative light, assuming that
he, like much of the war cabinet, based his strategies and diplomacy on ideas of European
superiority and oriental weakness. However, new archival evidence has come to light which
paints a much more nuanced account of Churchill’s role in British/Ottoman diplomacy.
Using these new sources such as Churchill’s personal correspondence with Ottoman
leaders such as Djavid Bey and Enver Pasha, this article will explore Churchill’s
relationship with the Ottoman empire and his role in shaping British/Ottoman diplomacy.
Taking into account the history of Churchill’s opinions, attitudes and policies, this article
will reveal that Churchill was initially supportive of an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, only
to be thwarted by the First World War. It will demonstrate that Churchill’s support for
an Ottoman alliance owed partially to his Victorian Tory background and to a greater
extent, a fear of a pan-Islamic uprising. Ultimately this article will reveal that Churchill’s
relationship with the Ottoman empire was far more complex than is typically thought and
was built on a unique blend of Victorian orientalism, geopolitical strategy and personal
sympathies.
I n January 1916, Winston Churchill settled in the trenches of thewestern front in near Ypres. He had been ejected from his positionof First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915 owing to the break down of
relations between him and Jackie Fisher over the disastrous Dardanelles
campaign which ultimately led to the resignation of both parties. Perhaps
unconventionally, Churchill sought to redeem himself by joining a theatre
of war, personally. Churchill wrote home to his wife from the western
front and reﬂected on how he had come to such a position and on his
relationship with Turkey. His official biographer, Martin Gilbert, has
argued that Churchill had believed before the campaign that ‘Enver’s
followers would abandon the German cause when confronted with so
powerful a demonstration of British superiority, and that Enver himself
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might perhaps take the lead in shaking Turkey from the German grip’.1
Remarkably, in his letter Churchill even proclaimed: ‘After the war I shall
be friends with Enver and will make a great Turkish policy with him.
Perhaps!’2
This seems like an extremely bizarre pronouncement from a man who
had suffered such a loss to Turkish forces. However, it does illustrate that
Churchill’s relationship with the Ottoman empire is far more nuanced
and complex than he is typically given credit for. Many historians and
biographers have tended to paint Churchill’s view of the Ottoman empire
as very negative because they typically view the Dardanelles andGallipoli
campaign in a vacuum;3 though more recently, scholarship has included
the aftermath of the First World War and the restructuring of the Middle
East.4 This ignores the fact that Churchill reﬂected on theOttoman empire
and Turkey a great deal before the the First World War even started and
his positions were often complex and at times contradictory. This article
will examine the evolution of this relationship by examining Churchill’s
early views of the Ottoman empire, and focusing on his correspondence
and actions just prior to the outbreak of the First World War. It will
further consider how Churchill’s view of the Ottoman empire affected his
role in the design of the Dardanelles campaign.
WinstonChurchill, like his father LordRandolphChurchill, came from
a Conservative political background. Many in the Tory party approached
the British relationship with the Ottoman empire in geostrategic terms.
TheTory leader BenjaminDisraeli andmany other Tories were committed
to the structural integrity of the Ottoman empire as an ally against
Russian Expansion in Asia and the Near East. Winston Churchill later
described the Tory mood on the Eastern Question as ‘tremendous
and inﬂexible’.5 Despite this atmosphere, Lord Randolph welcomed the
sacriﬁce of Ottoman holdings in the Balkans and even reached out
1 Martin Gilbert (ed.),Winston S. Churchill, III (London, 1971) [hereafterWSC], p. 248. This refers
to Enver Pasha.
2 Winston Churchill to Clementine Churchill, 28 Jan. 1916, M. Gilbert (ed.), Winston S. Churchill
Companion, 5 vols (London, 1966-82) [hereafterWSC,C], III, pt 2, p. 1402 [hereafterWSC,C].
3 Owing to the number of texts written on Churchill it is impossible to have an exhaustive list of those
concerning his views of the Ottoman empire and Turkey. Churchill’s own biographer, Martin Gilbert,
can be vague on Churchill’s relationship with Turkey. In his official biography, Gilbert regularly
illustrates Churchill’s sympathetic view of Turkey especially during and after the First World War
and several instances of this are cited below. However, in his book Churchill and the Jews (London,
2007) Gilbert says little more than ‘Churchill felt it was time to make a “clean sweep” of Turkey’
(p. 29). For examples of studies which show Churchill’s view of Turkey as extremely negative see
WilliamManchester, The Last LionWinston Spencer Churchill: Visions of Glory 1874–1932 (London,
1983), p. 470; David French, ‘The origins of the Dardanelles campaign reconsidered’,History, 68/223
(1983), pp. 210–24; David French, ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: prestige as a factor in British
eastern strategy 1914–1916’, War and Society, 5/1 (1987), pp. 45–61; Earl of Birkenhead, Churchill
1874–1922 (London, 1989), pp. 335–56; Clive Ponting, Churchill (London, 1994), p. 170.
4 See for instance, Norman Rose, Churchill an Unruly Giant (London, 1994), p. 162; Michael
Makovsky, Churchill’s Promised Land (New Haven, 2007), pp. 89–96; Richard Toye, Lloyd George
and Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London, 2012), p. 233. However, these texts do not systematically
examine Churchill’s relationship with the Ottoman empire prior to the First World War.
5 Winston Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, I (New York, 1906), p. 99.
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to the Liberal, ﬁrebrand Charles Dilke, declaring that the aim of the
British government should be ‘the complete freedom and independence
of the Slav nationality, as opposed to any reconstruction of the Turkish
Empire’.6 Lord Randolph’s rejection of the ‘Conservatives’ Turcophilia’
can also be seen in his letters to Lady Randolph Churchill.7
However, as Winston Churchill pointed out in his father’s biography,
these views were entirely private. In the political friction between
Conservatives and Liberals on the Eastern Question ‘Lord Randolph
Churchill took no public part’ and it is only from his ‘private letters that
we may learn how decided were his sympathies’.8 Perhaps this indicates
that Churchill was not particularly committed one way or another. But
a more convincing view might be that Churchill was simply using the
EasternQuestion to ‘sabotage his party’s stance’ and advance the standing
of his Conservative splinter group, the ‘Fourth Party’.9 In any case,
understanding Lord Randolph’s actual position is difficult because of
his numerous contradictory and paradoxical positions on the matter. In
an article in Fortnightly in 1883, Churchill praised the late Benjamin
Disraeli’s policies on ‘imperial rule’ and ‘the great Eastern development
of the empire’.10
While the full complexities of the Victorian politics surrounding Lord
Randolph Churchill and the Eastern Question are beyond the scope of
this article, it is clear how Winston Churchill understood his father’s
views on the government’s occupation of Egypt in 1882. The biography
of his father explains that Lord Randolph believed ‘the whole policy of
intervention seemed a ﬂagrant political blunder and a crowning violation
of Liberal principles’. Winston believed his father saw it as a ‘wicked’ and
an ‘unjust war’.11 Though the occupation was reluctantly supported by
the majority of the Conservative Party on the grounds that ‘the ministers
had done their duty to the national interest’, their support might well
have been a political gamble to undermine the Liberal Party and its
leader William Gladstone.12 Though Gladstone was unenthusiastic about
British intervention, he allowed his government, as Winston Churchill
put it, to be ‘dragged deeper and deeper into the horrible perplexities of
the Egyptian riddle’.13 Despite his initial hesitation, eventually Gladstone
embraced his role as imperialist and had ‘eager outbursts of triumphalism
and vainglory’.14
This reverse from Gladstone’s approach to foreign policy illustrates to
some degree the cultural lens through which he and the Liberal Party
6 Lord Randolph Churchill to Charles Dilke, 8 Feb. 1878; ibid., p. 101.
7 Roy Foster,Lord Randolph Churchill: A Political Life (Oxford, 1981), p. 45; Lord Randolph to Lady
Randolph, 11 May 1877, CHAR 28/5, The Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge
8 Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 99.
9 Roy Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, pp. 44–5.
10 Ibid., p. 115.
11 Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 223.
12 Richard Shannon, Gladstone: Heroic Minister 1865–1898 (London, 1999), p. 306.
13 Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 225.
14 Shannon, Gladstone, p. 306.
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understood the British relationship with the east, and theOttoman empire
in particular. He tended to see the Ottoman empire in religious terms
and thus as an ‘outsider’ in Europe. In a letter to Edwin Freshﬁeld,
Gladstone said: ‘With regard to the condition of the Turkish Empire I
cannot regard the Musslaman rule in Europe as normal or permanent’,
though he stops short of saying they should be forced past the straits
and out of Europe. He does add that: ‘in Asia I have ever supposed
they had a greater chance of duration with a fairer ﬁeld’.15 This is
conﬁrmed by his denunciation of the Berlin Treaty in 1880 which re-
established a greater Turkey-in-Europe by altering the Treaty of San
StefanoTreaty of 1878. CompoundingGladstone’s anti-Ottoman outlook
was his sincere philhellenic approach to the eastern Mediterranean. He
supported Greek claims in Thessaly, Epirus and Crete and lambasted
the Berlin treaty as ‘insane’ because he thought it supported the
integrity ofOttoman holdings againstGreek territorial ambitions.16 These
differences in world-view between the Conservatives and Liberals had
interesting effects on the young Churchill’s understanding of the Ottoman
empire.17
One of Churchill’s earliest and serious reﬂections on the Ottoman
empire was before his departure for India in 1897. In a series of letters
between Churchill and his mother, they argued over the situation in the
Balkans and the impending Graeco-Turkish War.18 The Conservative
government of the Marquess of Salisbury had adopted a policy of non-
intervention, holding that Crete should remain with the Ottoman empire.
This was highly controversial and unpopular because the Ottomans had
massacred nearly 10,000 Christians on Crete and it appeared as if the
Salisbury government was backing ‘the cause of Moslem barbarism’.19
Lady Randolph imploredWinston to try to understand that the Salisbury
government was acting in the interest of the British empire in relation
to the concert of Europe. However, perhaps echoing his father’s earlier
positions, Churchill saw the political inaction and courting of the
Ottoman empire as an illogical and unethical foreign policy.20 On 6 April
1897, he wrote what seemed to be his ﬁnal observation on the subject. He
noted that Britain was ‘doing a very wicked thing’ and that he believed the
goal of Lord Salisbury’s foreign policy in the region was to keep Russia
out of Constantinople even at the cost of ‘those oppressed by the [Turkish]
Empire’. Churchill concluded by arguing:
15 W. Gladstone to E. Freshﬁeld, 13 Nov. 1871; H. C. G. Matthew (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries,
VIII (Oxford, 1982), p. 62.
16 On Gladstone’s and Liberal philhellenism see Shannon, Gladstone, pp. 190, 223.
17 See Richard Toye,Churchill’s Empire: TheWorld thatMadeHim and theWorld HeMade (London,
2011), pp. 3–61.
18 See Mehmet Ug˘ur Ekinci, The Unwanted War: The Diplomatic Background of the Ottoman-Greek
War of 1897 (Ankara, 2006).
19 WSC,C, I, pt 2, p. 735.
20 Winston Churchill and Lady Randolph Churchill in a series of letters, spring of 1897;WSC,C, I,
pt 2, pp. 734, 735, 740, 748.
C© 2017 The Author. History C© 2017 The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
72 ‘A GREAT TURKISH POLICY’
This is not only wrong it is foolish. It is wrong because it is unjustiﬁable to
kill people who are not attacking you . . . and because it is an abominable
action which prolongs the servitude under the Turks of the Christians races.
It is foolish because as surely as night follows day− the Russians are bound
to get to Constantinople. We could never stop them even if we wished.
Nor ought we wish for anything that could impede the expulsion from
Europe of the ﬁlthy oriental.21
This letter serves as an example of Churchill’s initial ‘orientalist’ view
of the Ottoman empire. This can be seen in his characterization of the
struggle as between Christian countries and Muslim countries. However,
Churchill quickly reversed his position, declaring in a letter to his mother
that ‘the declaration of war by Turkey on Greece [had] changed all
[his] plans’. He then expressed a desire to join the battle between the
two Balkan powers. However, perhaps counter-intuitively, he could not
choose which side to join because, while his sympathies were ‘entirely
with the Greeks’, he thought that ‘the Turks are bound to win, they are in
enormous strength and will be on the offensive the whole time’.22
By 28April hemade up hismind to ﬁght on the side of theOttomans and
asked hismother to sendmoney to theOttoman bank.However, Churchill
feared the Balkan War would be over too soon for him to get involved.
According to Churchill’s autobiographyMy Early Life (1930), he met Ian
Hamilton (later Sir General IanHamilton) on the transfer boat, and while
Hamilton had promised his service to Greece, Churchill had promised his
to Turkey. While Churchill’s peculiar allegiance to Turkey largely owes to
his lust for glory, an additional explanation might be that he inherited
a ‘Turkophile’ attitude from his father. Churchill went on to write that
Hamilton was a ‘romantic’ and was thus ‘for the Greeks’, while he ‘having
been brought up a Tory . . . was for the Turks’.23 However, their formal
confrontation was not to be, for by the time they reached their port of
call at Port Said in Egypt, the war was over. Churchill lamented his lost
adventure in a letter to his mother in late May 1897: ‘I have reluctantly
had to give up all hopes of Turkey as the war has ﬁzzled out − like a
damp ﬁrework.’24
The ﬂexibility of Churchill’s views on Turkey might be seen in light
of his own ambiguous political identity during the early years of his
career. It was already evident that by 1897, Churchill ‘did not regard
the Conservative Party as his natural political home’.25 In the same
letter in which he denounced Lord Salisbury’s foreign policy with
Russia and Turkey as ‘foolish’ and ‘wicked’, Churchill confessed to
his mother that he was ‘a Liberal in all but name’.26 Despite this,
Churchill entered parliament in 1900 as a Conservative, but by 1902
21 Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, 6 April 1897, CHAR 28/23/31–33A.
22 Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, 21 April 1897; CHAR 28/23/36–8.
23 Winston Churchill,My Early Life (London, 1930), p. 121.
24 Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, 26 May 1897; CHAR 28/23/41A–41B.
25 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, p. 90.
26 Winston Churchill to Lady Randolph Churchill, 6 April 1897, CHAR 28/23/31–33A.
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he had become frustrated with the Conservative Party’s penchant for
protectionist economic policies. InMay 1904 Churchill formally switched
to the Liberal Party, not as a rejection of Conservative foreign policy with
Turkey but from an interest in domestic social reform.27
Despite his becoming a ‘Liberal enfant terrible’, Churchill’s view
of Britain’s foreign policy toward Turkey remained closer to the
traditional Conservative perspective.28 As Colonial Under-Secretary in
1907 Churchill visited Cyprus and supported the Turkish claims on the
island as well as the minority rights of the Turkish Cypriots.29 Churchill
was also careful to keep an eye on state of Anglo-Turkish affairs during
the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 while he was President of the Board
of Trade. Hubert Llewellyn Smith, the Permanent Secretary to the Board
of Trade, wrote Churchill that ‘with what’s going on in Turkey’ Britain
must be on ‘alert to protect and advance British interests as what’s taking
place is bound to affect the relative inﬂuence of different Powers and may
lead to quite unexpected results’.30 Churchill also told his friend Paul
Schoeberg he was ‘interested in Turkish affairs’ and received a letter from
Schoeberg which warned of the unpopularity of the Dette Publique and
the Regie des Tabacs in Turkey, urging a more laissez-faire approach to
Ottoman debt.31 But Churchill’s most obvious move towards thinking
of Turkey as a potential ally prior to 1911 can be seen in his report to
Edward Grey after meeting Enver Bey Pasha in Berlin in 1909. Churchill
praised Enver for ‘the part he played in recent events and told him with
how much sympathy it had been watched in England’. Churchill also
explained that while ‘both great Parties at home where well disposed’ to
the new regime, Turkey should take care to avoid a war with Greece in
the near future because ‘it would be an embarrassment to us, in England
and especially to those in the Liberal Party’. Churchill then moved to
defend the British interests in Turkey, telling Enver that he feared the
‘ﬁnancial reorganisation’ undertaken by the new Turkish Government
might ‘impose some hardships’ for Britain.32 Despite this Churchill, left
with a very positive impression of Enver and the Young Turk Movement.
He told Grey, that Enver had ‘impressed me very favourably indeed’ and
he later described Enver as ‘a ﬁne looking young officer’33 and ‘a would-be
Turkish Napoleon’.34
Churchill’s sympathy for the new Turkish regime helps explain one of
his ﬁrst endeavours at the Admiralty. He sought to forge a political and
27 Toye, Churchill’s Empire, p. 95.
28 Ibid., p. 90.
29 Churchill, Colonial Office report, Colonial Office, National Archives, Kew CO/883/7/3; See
W. Dockter, Churchill and the Islamic World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle
East (London, 2015), pp. 41–3.
30 Hubert Llewellyn Smith to Winston Churchill, 11 Aug. 1908; CHAR 11/3.
31 Paul Schoeberg to Winston Churchill, 13 Aug. 1908; CHAR 2/35/12–13.
32 Churchill to EdwardGrey;Report onConversationwithEnver Bey, 22 Sept. 1909; CHAR2/39/93–
100.
33 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, V: The Aftermath (London, 1929), p. 356.
34 Churchill,My Early Life, pp. 56–7.
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strategic relationship with the Ottoman empire. Prior to thr First World
War, Anglo-Turkish relations hung in a delicate balance. Both Britain
and Germany attempted to sway Turkey to their side, further illustrating
that ‘Churchill tried to encourage an actively pro-Turkish policy before
1914’.35
In July 1910, Churchill, his wife Clementine and a group of friends
went on a holiday to Constantinople. Though Churchill was Home
Secretary at the time he did not shy away from informal diplomacy.During
a stopover at Constantinople, Churchill met the Sultan, the German
ambassador, Marschall von Bieberstein, and several leading members of
the Young Turk movement including Enver. Though Churchill had no
diplomatic brief, he suggested to the Pashas that the Ottomans should
remain neutral in any European struggle that might arise, urging them to
‘remain the courted party rather than one which is engaged’.36 According
to biographer Rene Kraus, Churchill even spoke to Bieberstein about
the possibility of Germany and Britain splitting the Baghdad railway as
allies.37 After returning to Britain Churchill met with his friend Wilfrid S.
Blunt in October 1910, who recorded Churchill’s thoughts and reﬂections
on his trip:
At Constantinople [Churchill] stayed four days and had been taken to see
the new sultan, but found him uninteresting indeed senile. Djavid Pasha
had shown him about and talked with several Young Turks, also with
Bieberstein, the German ambassador, of whose ability he formed a high
opinion. The Germans have got the better of our diplomacy there. He had
brought away a great sympathy with the Young Turks and was all for them
being encouraged and supported.38
However, the notion of a Turkish alliance really came to the fore in
Churchill’s mind in 1911. The Agadir Crisis in July that year convinced
Churchill that war was coming to Europe.39 By August Churchill had
written a memorandum which speculated how German and Austrian
forces might invade France.40 However, these early memos did not
mention the Ottoman empire as allied to either the Entente or Central
Powers. In late 1911, Churchill received a letter from a war correspondent
named H. C. Seppings Wright. Seppings Wright had been covering the
Libyan War, which arose when Italy annexed the Ottoman prefecture of
Libya. He reported to Churchill that the Italians committed ‘a wholesale
massacre of helpless women, children and old people’ and that ‘if a
nation of cannibals had been let loose they could not have committed
35 Martin Gilbert, Winston S Churchill (Minerva, London: 1991), III: The Challenge of War, 1914–
1916, Minerva Edition (London, 1990), p. 189.
36 Wilfrid S. Blunt, My Diaries: Being a Personal Narrative of Events, 1888–1914 (New York, 1923),
p. 736.
37 Rene Kraus,Winston Churchill (London, 1941), p. 158. Churchill also raised this idea with Enver
Pasha in 1909 as a way to alleviate Turkish debt and improve relations, see CHAR 2/39/93–100.
38 Blunt, Diaries, pp. 735–6.
39 Churchill’s notes on the Agadir Crisis, CHAR 2/89/26–32.
40 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis: 1911–1918, abridged edn (London, 2005), pp. 39–41.
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more abhorrent outrages’.41 This caused great concern because Churchill
had received a letter from Djavid Bey, who wondered if the time had
arrived ‘for a permanent alliance between our two countries?’. Djavid
Bey continued by assuring Churchill that his views would be considered
‘entirely personal and unofficial’ but that he would be happy if ‘we can
prepare a possible ground for official purposes’.42
Before responding to Djavid Bey, Churchill wrote to Edward Grey the
Foreign Secretary on 4 November 1911 to give his opinions regarding the
letter. Churchill argued that ‘Italy has behaved atrociously’ and that even
the Liberal party ‘must be stirred against the Italians’. However, he was
also aware of ‘a strong historical Turkish party among the Conservatives
throughout the country’ and that ‘we must not forget that we are the
greatest Mohammedan power in the world. We are the only power who
can really help and guide [Turkey]’. Further underlining his hope that
the Ottoman’s might be brought in as an ally against the Central powers
Churchill wrote: ‘Have we not more to apprehend from the consequence
of throwing Turkey . . . into the arms of Germany’. He continued: ‘this
is not intended to advocate a Turkish alliance at the present time but
to emphasize the importance of two steps − ﬁrst a sympathetic and
respectful consent of the Turkish appeal, and secondly a clear protest
against the vile massacres of woman and little children which have
dishonoured the Italian arms’. Churchill concluded by saying that ‘a turn,
or even a gesture might produce a lasting impression on the Mahometan
world’.43
Churchill’s letter was signiﬁcant because it demonstrates his
appreciation that the British Empire was ‘the greatest Mohammedan
power in the world’44 and that Britain was the ‘only power who can really
help and guide [Turkey]’. In fact, it is remarkable that Churchill used this
concept in official policy documents. While the notion that the British
Empire was ‘the greatest Mohammedan power in the world’ had been
in British academic circles since the early 1880s,45 and was occasionally
referenced by statesmen concerned with the east (especially after the
census in 1901), Churchill may have actually come to this notion while
he was in Constantinople meeting several members of the Young Turks.
41 H.C. Seppings Wright to Churchill, 18 Dec. 1911; CHAR 2/53/84.
42 Djavid Bey to Winston Churchill, 28 Oct. 1911 in WSC,C, II, pt 2, p. 1368. It is remarkable
that Churchill and Djavid Bey actually kept a correspondence going since Churchill had visited
Constantinople, congratulating one another on promotions and keeping one another informed about
state developments. These letters probably contributed to Churchill’s admiration for the CUP and the
Young Turk movement in general. For examples of their correspondence see CHAR 2/52.
43 Winston Churchill to Sir Edward Grey, 4 Nov. 1911 in GilbertWSC, C, III, pt 2, pp. 1369–70.
44 There were approximately 20 million Muslims in Turkey in 1910. In British India there were
approximately 62 million Muslims and 10 million Muslims in Egypt.
45 In How India Was Won by England Under Clive and Hastings (London, 1881), the author Rev.
Savile quoted Professor Monier Williams (Oxford) who said of British subjects: ‘Nearly 41 millions
are Mohammedans; so that England is by far the greatest Mohammedan power in the world, so that
the Queen reigns over about double as many Moslems as the Representative of the Khalif himself’
(p. viii).
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One of the Young Turks, named Sabah-ed Din (who was a relative of
the Sultan), wrote editorials that appeared in imperial British papers
such as The Advertiser (Adelaide), The Singapore Free Press and The
SydneyMorning Herald from 1908 to 1912, arguing for an Anglo-Turkish
alliance on the grounds that the large number of Muslim subjects made
the two powers natural allies.46 Having been in contact with such currents
of thought, it seems plausible that Churchill heard this notion while he
was in Constantinople and adopted it when he returned to London. The
fact that Churchill had previously never referenced the number of Islamic
subjects in the British and Ottoman empires despite having an admitted
preference for the Ottomans (as opposed to the Greeks) adds weight to
the idea that he picked up the notion of an alliance based on the religious
similarity of imperial subjects. This is further strengthened by the fact
that Djavid Bey chose speciﬁcally to write to Churchill to propose such
an alliance, which suggests he believed that the Young Turks formed a
positive relationship with Churchill.
Likewise, Churchill understood the importance of working with the
Islamic community, especially in this period. Despite the fact that there
were elements of strategic positioning against Germany and a fear of
a pan-Islamic disruption in Churchill’s motivations here, there was also
simply an interest in oriental culture. It must be remembered that this
letter was written by a man who had spent a considerable amount of
time in Islamic countries as a young subaltern, and was critical of his
superiors in themilitary and in politics for their harshmethods of war and
punitive expeditions against theirMuslim rivals. Sowhile Churchill’s main
concern was British interests, his understanding of the Islamic world and
his concern for Muslim populations (both inside and outside the British
Empire) undoubtedly played a role in his thinking.
Churchill received Grey’s response on 9 November,47 and saw that
the Foreign Office wanted to send something ‘melliﬂuous’ but ‘would
not agree to anything substantial’ despite Churchill’s wish to send
an ‘encouraging’ reply.48 Churchill wrote back to Djavid Bey on 19
November to explain that Britain ‘deﬁnitely declared’ its neutrality and
as a result Churchill lamented that his answer must be ‘that at the present
time we cannot enter upon new political relations’. Despite the diplomatic
tone that Churchill was forced to adopt by Grey and the Foreign Office,
his genuine interest in maintaining an alliance with Turkey is visible.
Churchill went on to say that: ‘In the future the enormous interests which
unite the two great Mussulman powers, should keep us in touch. That
is our wish.’ Churchill concluded that: ‘We earnestly desire to revive
46 See Sabah-ed Din, ‘Lords of Islam: why an Anglo-Turkish entente may come’, in the Adelaide
Advertiser, 19 Oct. 1912, p. 8, and in The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, 1 Nov.
1912, p. 3. Also see additional editorials in the Sydney Morning Herald, 1908; Mohamad Abdalla,
Islam and the Australian News Media (Sydney, 2010).
47 Lord Grey to Churchill, 9 Nov. 1911 inWSC,C, III, pt 2, pp. 1370–1.
48 Gilbert,WSC, p. 190.
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and maintain our old friendship with Turkey which while we retain the
supremacy of the sea should be a friendship of value’.49
Churchill continued to work towards solidifying relations with
the Ottoman empire. He sent Rear-Admiral Arthur Limpus to
Constantinople as head of the British Naval Mission, to train the
Turkish navy. According to Gilbert, Limpus was ‘a popular ﬁgure at
Constantinople; he represented Britain’s desire to help Turkey recover
her strength after the crushing defeat of 1912 at the hands of the Balkan
States’.50 Churchill urged Limpus to work closely with the Turks and, as a
result, many in the Turkish navy became increasingly pro-British. Limpus
even began to lay the foundations for a restructuring of the Turkish navy
by persuading contractorsArmstrongWhitworth andVickers tomake ‘an
offer to the Turkish government to build necessary installations for new
battleships’.51
However, Britain was not the only power courting the Ottoman empire.
Germany had been working on relations with Turkey since before the turn
of the century, before the Young Turks took control of the government.
Sultan Abdul-Hamid II had pursued a pan-Islamic stance for some time,
as he believed it would ‘give some unity to his ramshackle empire’ and
that it ‘deterred those powers, principally France, Russia, and Britain,
who already ruled large numbers of Moslems from further despoiling
his empire’.52 This approach was successful, especially with Britain.
According to historian David French, ‘Fear of a Moslem uprising placed
a subtle but nonetheless real constraint on British strategic planning
before 1914.’53 This was not an unfounded fear: the Sultan’s agents easily
established ties with Muslims in the various European empires, much to
European apprehension.
Germany, however, unlike other European powers, saw this as an
advantage. Kaiser Wilhelm II was very friendly to the Ottomans. He sent
Sultan Abdul-Hamid II a birthday card in 1896, when other European
leaders were denouncing the Sultan as ‘Abdul the Damned’.54 The Kaiser
even visited Constantinople in 1898 and proclaimed at a state banquet:
‘His majesty the Sultan and the 300 million Muslims scattered across the
globe who revere him as their Caliph can rest assured that the German
Emperor is and will at all time remain their friend.’55
In an attempt to draw the Ottoman empire away from Germany in
December 1911, Churchill insisted that Turkey ‘received what seemed to
the British eyes, the most favourable offer ever made to any government
49 Winston Churchill to Djavid Bey, 19 Nov. 1911;WSC,C, III, pt 2, p. 1321.
50 Gilbert,WSC, III, p. 188.
51 Ibid., p. 190.
52 David French, ‘The Dardanelles, Mecca and Kut: prestige as a factor in British eastern strategy
1914–1916’,War and Society, 5/1 (1987), pp. 45–61, at p. 48.
53 Ibid., p. 49.
54 Walter Reid, Empire of Sand: How Britain Made the Middle East (London, 2011), p. 11.
55 Kaiser Wilhelm II, quoted in Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot
to Bring Down the British Empire (London, 1994), p. 57.
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in history’.56 The offer included two battleships, the Reshadieh and the
Sultan Osman I, at reduced prices and an offer to build a dock in which to
keep them. The Turkish navy happily accepted the terms and a deal was
struck. The construction of a new dock would ensure a British presence in
Constantinople and increase trade, commerce and the living standards in
Turkey: ‘Through battle ships and ﬁnance, Britain and Turkey were being
brought together.’ Churchill later write that he ‘believed in the friendship
between the British and Ottoman empires’.57
By July 1914 both vessels were almost ready to leave British waters
and make their way to Constantinople. But Churchill was wary of letting
such powerful warships leave Britain, owing to the looming threat of war
with Germany. His consideration for British interests overrode his interest
in helping Turkey. Dan van der Vat, a naval historian, has used this to
argue that Churchill did not appreciate the strategic importance of Turkey.
Van der Vat argued: ‘Apparently, the addition of two capital ships to the
Royal Navy was regarded as outweighing the drastically underestimated
importance of Turkish goodwill or neutrality.’58
But this does not acknowledge Churchill’s notion that German
diplomacy had already won Turkish affections. After all, Turkish
neutrality was still heavily doubted. It was this diplomatic situation that
weighed onChurchill’s mind, not a dismissal of the importance of Turkish
neutrality. As a result, Churchill was compelled to commandeer the ships
and immediately consulted the Foreign Office. Grey’s response was: ‘we
must let the Admiralty deal with this question as they consider necessary
and afterwards make such a defence of our action to Turkey as we can’.59
At ﬁrst, Churchill was content to let the Armstrong Whitworth workers
continue delaying completion. But by the end of July, he convinced
members of the Cabinet that both ships would be needed against the
German navy and, by 1 August, Churchill had Sultan Osman I boarded
by British sailors.
The Turkish government was furious. This action alienated several of
the relatively pro-British Young Turk ministers such as Djavid Bey, and
even those who advocated neutrality, which drove Turkey further into
the arms of the German empire. However, historian Peter Hopkirk has
contended that the ‘announcement [of British intentions] wasmade on the
very same day that the Germans and the Turks signed their secret alliance.
Although, the British had no inkling of this clandestine accord, it would
in fact have more than justiﬁed Churchill’s decision.’60 However, Gilbert
pointed out that the treaty which Enver signed with German ambassador
Wangenheim actually was not that official: ‘This treaty was unknown
56 Churchill,World Crisis, abridged edn, p. 274.
57 Gilbert,WSC, pp. 188–91.
58 Dan van der Vat, The Ship that Changed the World: The Escape of the ‘Goeben’ to the Dardanelles
in 1914 (London, 1985), p. 27.
59 Ibid., p. 192.
60 Hopkirk, Secret Service, p. 57.
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even to the neutralist and pro-British members of the Turkish Cabinet.
It did not commit Turkey to enter the war at Germany’s side, but gave
the Germans the overriding inﬂuence in the Turkish capital.’61 If Gilbert’s
analysis is correct and the treaty was largely based on control of inﬂuence
in Constantinople, then Churchill’s action actually did push the Turkish
opinion against the British and deconstructed Churchill’s vision of an
alliance of the two largest Muslim powers. Despite this new ‘clandestine
accord’ with Germany, the aborted British deal was perceived as ‘an act of
piracy’62 by the Ottoman empire, which had levelled a tax on their subjects
in order to pay the £3,680,650 bill.63 In fact: ‘Thousands of school children
who contributed their pocket money to the vessels’ purchase marched in
protest against the British Government’s action.’64 Churchill even hinted
in his World Crisis that contributions were not limited to Turkey but
spread ‘even throughout all Islam’.65
The situation in Constantinople was further complicated by the arrival
of theGerman cruisers theBreslau and theGoeben. On 11AugustAdmiral
Souchon, captain of the Goeben, was ordered to ‘go to Constantinople
as quickly as possible in order thereby to compel Turkey to side with us
[Germany] on the basis of the treaty that has been concluded’.66 Souchon
was successful in convincing the Turks to uphold their clandestine treaty.
Later that day, Churchill was made aware of the situation and telegraphed
Sir Berkeley Milne to keep an eye on the Dardanelles and make sure
that the German ships do not re-enter the Mediterranean. On 15 August,
Churchill sent Grey a copy of his intended telegram to Enver Pasha, the
Turkish minister of war and an acquaintance of Churchill’s. Churchill’s
brief note to Grey on the cover said: ‘Don’t Jump; but do you mind my
sending this personal message to Enver. I have answered this man and am
sure it will do good. But of course your “NO” is ﬁnal.’67 Grey approved
andChurchill sent a telegram toAdmiral Limpus to be personally handed
over to Enver, thus making it a personal message from Churchill.
Churchill’s telegram pleaded for Enver not to ‘make a mistake which
will undo the services you have rendered Turkey and cast away the
successes of the second Balkan War’. But Churchill also warned that
siding with Germany openly or secretly now must mean the greatest
disaster to you, your comrades, and your country’. He then assured
Enver ‘that if Turkey remains loyal to her neutrality, a solemn agreement
to respect the integrity of the Turkish Empire must be a condition of
any terms of peace that affect the near East’. Churchill concluded on a
personal note: ‘The personal regard I have for you, Talaat, and Djavid
and the admiration with which I have followed your career from our
61 Gilbert,WSC, p. 193.
62 Ibid., p. 192.
63 Figure taken from Gilbert,WSC, p. 191.
64 Peter Hopkirk, Secret Service, p. 57.
65 Churchill,World Crisis, abridged edn, p. 276.
66 Gilbert,WSC, p. 193.
67 Winston Churchill to Grey, 15 Aug. 1914, CHAR 13/45/1.
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ﬁrst meeting at Wurzburg alone leads me to speak these words of
friendship before it is too late.’68
This telegram displayed Churchill’s personal attachment to his
acquaintances in the Young Turks but also Churchill’s conviction that
a German and Ottoman alliance was a step backwards in terms of
advancement of Turkey. From Churchill’s perspective an alliance between
the Ottoman empire and the British Empire would be amodernizing force
for Turkey. However, Grey and Churchill’s desire to keep Turkey neutral
by guaranteeing her territorial sovereignty was not without its beneﬁts
for Britain, not just in terms of strategic location, but also by aligning the
wills of the two great Muslim powers. Logistically, this would have kept
‘Russia away from Constantinople and the Straits and the Germans away
from head of the Persian Gulf’.69 Whether Churchill was motivated by
opportunism or benevolence for his Turkish friends (or more probably a
mixture of the two) he still pushed for Turkish neutrality.
However, as Enver remained silent, Churchill’s disappointment turned
into anger and by the Cabinet meeting of 17 August, his belligerent tone
was audible. After the meeting, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith wrote
to Venetia Stanley: ‘Turkey has come into the foreground, threatens
vaguely enterprises against Egypt and seemed disposed to play a double
game about the Goeben and the Breslau. Winston, in his most bellicose
mood, is all for sending a torpedo ﬂotilla through the Dardanelles −
to threaten and if necessary to sink the Goeben and her consort.’70
Churchill’s aggressive posturing and frustration with the situation was on
the one hand characteristic of his increasingly defensive nature regarding
British interests in the climate of imminent war, but on the other hand
seemed counter-intuitive regarding his hopes for an alliance of the two
great Muslim powers. Perhaps ironically, Kitchener (the man Churchill
criticized for his harsh treatment of Muslims) was urging the Cabinet
not to be aggressive against the Ottoman empire due to the Muslim
population in the British Empire.71 Grey agreed with Kitchener and
thought it best to delay Turkey’s entry into the war as long as possible in
order to ‘stand well in the eyes of [British] Moslem subjects’.72 According
to Grey’s autobiography, he was persuaded to take this position:
An Indian personage of very high prestige in the Moslem world came to
see me. He urged earnestly that Turkey should be kept out of the war: if we
were at war with Turkey it might cause great trouble for Moslem British
subjects and be a source of embarrassment both to them and to us . . . he
68 Winston Churchill to Enver Pasha, 15 Aug, 1914, CHAR 13/45/96–99. The second paragraph was
actually added by Grey before Churchill sent the telegraph.
69 French, ‘Prestige’, p. 48.
70 Herbert Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 17 Aug. 1914, in Michael and Eleanor Brock (eds), H. H.
Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1985), pp. 170–2; see also Herbert Asquith,Memories and
Reflections: The Earl of Oxford and Asquith, II (London, 1928), p. 26.
71 Aaron Klieman, ‘Britain’s War Aims in the Middle East in 1915’, in Journal of Contemporary
History, 3/3, ‘The Middle East’ (1968), p. 238.
72 French, ‘Prestige’, p. 48.
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then urged that, if it was impossible to avoid war with Turkey, it should
come in [a] way as to make it clearly and unmistakably not our fault; that
it should be evident that we had done all that was possible to avoid war.73
Kitchener and Grey’s fear of a pan-Islamic uprising carried the day,
despite Churchill’s aggressive and irrational posturing in the Cabinet
meeting. Churchill’s behaviour might be explained by the idea that he
felt personally betrayed by Enver and his other friends in the Turkish
government. In The World Crisis: The Aftermath (1929), Churchill
included a footnote saying he personally knew Turkish leaders.74 After
all, Churchill told Grey that he thought he had great sway with Enver and
could help the situation, though he had been unable to do so.
However, a turn of events the next day (18 August) raised Churchill’s
hopes again. Sir Louis Mallet, the British ambassador in Constantinople,
telegraphed The Foreign Office that Enver was ‘delighted with the offer
of respect for Turkish territorial integrity’ and that ‘public feeling would
be affected immediately if His Majesty’s Government would authorize
. . . an announcement at once that the seizure of Turkish ships was not
permanent’.75 Mallet also reported that a ‘public promise’ for the return
of the ships in good order would aide British support in the Turkish
population.
Upon hearing this news through Grey, Churchill immediately tried
to salvage the British position with the Ottoman empire. He wrote to
Admiral Trowbridge, a naval commander in the Mediterranean who was
guarding the mouth of the Dardanelles, that he was to ‘show no hostile
intentions to Turkey’ and to ‘use no threats’ and to ‘keep in touch with
the Ambassador at Constantinople’.76 However, later that day Mallet
reported to Grey that the naval minister in Turkey, Ahmed Djemal,
was ‘heart broken at the loss of his ships’ and that the British ‘could
not understand what an effect [their] action had had throughout the
Mussulman world and to what extent it was being exploited byGermany’.
Mallet added that if the First Lordwould send a ‘sympathetic and friendly
message . . . it would be well received’.77
Churchill telegraphed at once to Enver to try to defuse the situation. He
began by explaining that he ‘deeply regretted the necessity for detaining
the Turkish ships because I know the patriotism with which the money
had been raised all over Turkey’. Churchill then proposed the following
arrangement provided that ‘the last German officer and man belonging
to the Goeben and Breslau leaves Turkish waters’ and ‘so long as Turkey
maintains a loyal and impartial neutrality’:
(1) Both ships to be delivered to Turkey at the end of the war after being
thoroughly repaired at our expense in British Dockyards. (2) If either is
73 Edward Grey, Twenty-Five Years 1892–1916, III (London, 1935), p. 122.
74 Churchill,World Crisis, V, p. 356.
75 Sir Louis Mallet to the Foreign Office, 18 Aug. 1914, CHAR 13/45/142.
76 Winston Churchill to Vice Admiral Troubridge, 18 Aug. 1914, CHAR 13/35/59.
77 Sir Louis Mallet to the Foreign Office, 18 Aug. 1914, CHAR 13/45/139–40.
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sunk we will pay full value to Turkey immediately on the declaration of
peace. (3)Wewill also pay at once the actual extra expense caused to Turkey
by sending out crews and other incidents as determined by an arbitrator.
(4) As a compensation to Turkey for the delay in getting the ships we will
pay £1000 a day in weekly installments for every day we keep them, dating
retrospectively from when we took them over.78
Churchill sent the letter toAdmiral Limpus, who delivered the letter to the
Turkish navalminister alongwith themessage, ‘that had I had the pleasure
of his acquaintance I should have addressedmyself directly to him’.79 This
letter illustrated Churchill’s desire to keep the Ottoman empire neutral
at the very least. The letter to Enver offered substantial compensation
for the two ships and their eventual return, just as Enver had asked.
However, already having signed the secret treaty with the Germans, Enver
was probably following Churchill’s early advice to ‘remain the courted
party’. Whatever the case, it was a time of great tension and confusion
between the great Muslim powers. Churchill later stated:
I can recall no great sphere of policy about which the British Government
was less completely informed than the Turkish. It is strange to read the
telegramswe received through all channels fromConstantinople during this
period in light of our present knowledge. But, all theAllies, now encouraged
by the friendly assurances of the Grand Vizier and the respectable-effete
section of the Cabinet . . . believed that Turkey had no policy and might
still be won or lost.80
Churchill’s efforts were in vain. Enver decided (without full support of
the Turkish parliament) to support Germany and the Central Powers and
refused to hear Churchill’s proposal. As a result, the next time the British
Cabinet met, Asquith reported Churchill’s mood as ‘violently anti-Turk’
and that it was he, rather than Churchill, who was ‘against any aggressive
action vis a vis [sic] Turkey which would excite our Mussulmans in India
and Egypt’.81
As the situation escalated in theMediterranean, Churchill was anxious
to begin the new front. In TheWorld Crisis: 1911−1918, he wrote: ‘Lest it
should be thought that I underrated the gravity of war with Turkey, it must
be remembered that I had convinced myself that Turkey would attack
us sooner or later.’82 Despite this, Churchill continued to work toward
Turkish neutrality until the very end when Enver committed the Ottoman
empire to the Central Powers in October 1914. As a result of Turkey
becoming increasingly coy about their neutrality Churchill resolved: ‘If
we were not going to secure honest Turkish neutrality, then let us, in the
alternative, get the Christian States of the Balkans on our side.’83
78 Winston Churchill to Enver Pasha, 19 Aug. 1914 CHAR 13/45/141.
79 Winston Churchill to Admiral Limpus, 18 Aug. 1914 in Gilbert,WSC,C, III, pt 1, p. 45.
80 Churchill,World Crisis, abridged edn, p. 277.
81 Herbert Asquith to Venetia Stanley in Brock, Asquith, p. 186.
82 Churchill,World Crisis, abridged edn, p. 281.
83 Ibid., p. 279.
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This shift created a difficult state of affairs for the British Empire,
as its Muslim subjects might perceive that a war against the Ottoman
empire was a war against Islam. If this was the case, the situation might
spark up the pan-Islamic movements in India, Egypt and elsewhere in
the Empire. This was a precarious situation that Kaiser Wilhelm and
the German Intelligence Bureau of the east were eager to exploit. While
Enver Pasha was willing to work with the Germans to this end, he was
not himself a pan-Islamist. According to Charles Haley: ‘It is true that
Enver was aMuslim and unquestionably true that he believed in God; yet
one cannot derive from his commentaries the idea that he was a devout
Muslim.’84 Moreover, Haley pointed out that Enver used pan-Islamism as
a political vehicle but only until 1912. After that he sawmore opportunity
in alliances with European empires, especially Germany. This led Enver
to make relations strong with the German Empire, but when it became
strategically and politically convenient he was happy to pick up the pan-
Islamic banner if it pleased his German allies.
So with German war aims united with Pan-Islam, two antagonists
of the British Empire were linked and this was cause for much fear.
Kitchener, Grey, Asquith, and Churchill all had reason to fear a pan-
Islamic revival, as they had all experienced it in various forms. It was a
central issue in relations with the ‘East’. David French pointed out the
recurring theme in British attitudes since the Indian Mutiny of 1857:
Although the Indian Mutiny had involved both Moslems and Hindus it
had centred around the Moslem King of Delhi, whose dynasty had once
ruled most of India. Henceforth, the British saw Islam as perhaps the most
potential source of danger to their rule. The lessons of the Mutiny were
reinforced by the difficulties and humiliations the British experienced in
suppressing the Mahdist movement in Sudan in the 1880s and 1890s.85
This took an increasing toll on Churchill’s perception and the overall
British opinion of the Islamic world. Such writers as John Buchan (who
wrote the spy thriller Greenmantle (1916) ) explored the possibility of the
Germans inciting the Muslim world to rise up and wage jihad against
the British. This was not just happening in ﬁction, however. As early as
August 1914, Churchill was receiving intelligence reports of possible pan-
Islamic movements. A letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes to
Churchill on 24August 1914 conﬁrmed thatGermanywas ‘straining every
nerve to involve Turkey and so cause if possible a pan-Islamic diversion
against us, and as Caucasian complication for Russia on the Armenian
frontier’.86
Churchill had an increasing fear for the well-being of imperial interests
in the Middle East, Central Asia and India. Churchill saw the Turkish
84 Charles Haley, ‘The desperate Ottoman: Enver Pas¸a and the German empire (Part 1)’, Middle
Eastern Studies, 30/1 (1994), pp. 1–51, at p. 12.
85 Ibid., p. 47.
86 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes to Churchill, 24 Aug. 1914, CHAR/13/45/127.
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entry as an opportunity to unite the Balkan states against their traditional
foe, an idea that delighted Lloyd George and Asquith, who had always
pushed for Gladstone’s dream of a Europe free from Turkey, a political
position Churchill had rejected until the Turkish entry into the war.
In October 1914 Asquith wrote: ‘few things would give me greater
pleasure than to see the Turkish Empire ﬁnally disappear from Europe’.87
Endeavouring to create a new front that was not bogged down, Churchill,
Asquith, Kitchener and Grey set about to attack what seemed the most
vulnerable position of the Ottoman empire, the Dardanelles. This would
have allowed the British navy to demonstrate its power in the East, protect
the Suez Canal, and would lead directly to Constantinople, which (if
captured) might dissuade any pan-Islamic movements.
It was Churchill’s original contention that it would require a large
naval and expeditionary force to attack Gallipoli because he knew the
tenacity and courage of the Ottoman warriors. This is reﬂected in
Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey’s notes from a Cabinet meeting of 25
November: ‘Mr. Churchill suggested that the ideal method for defending
Egypt was an attack on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This if successful,
would give us control of the Dardanelles, and we could dictate terms at
Constantinople. This, however was a very difficult operation requiring
a large force.’88 This opinion was agreed to by Admiral Oliver, who
suggested that ‘troop transports should be kept in Egypt sufficient to
transport a division of troops to the Dardanelles should it become
possible to assemble men in the future’.89 Churchill sent this to Kitchener,
but Kitchener thought that troop transports were not necessary at the
present time.
Kitchener’s motives might best be explained by David French’s
argument that the authors of the Dardanelles were inﬂuenced by
orientalist motives. He argued: ‘In British eyes the Turks were not a
western nation but a backward eastern power, whose government was
unstable and faction-ridden.’90 This made Constantinople a ‘glittering
prize’, one thatwas ‘all themore attractive by the conviction that [it] would
fall into the Entente’s lap with very little effort’. French concludes by
arguing, ‘Nothing else can explain adequately the willingness of Asquith,
Grey, Churchill and Kitchener to push ahead with the Dardanelles
operation as a purely naval venture.’91
This, of course, unfairly groups Churchill with the other members of
the Cabinet. While French revealed evidence of Grey operating in the
orientalist paradigm, there is very little evidence that Churchill did as it
relates to his dealings with the Ottoman empire. However, French made
the argument that Churchill was operating in this paradigm based on
87 French, ‘Prestige’, p. 51.
88 Churchill in Cabinet minutes, 25 Nov. 1914,WSC,C, III, pt 1, p. 278.
89 Gilbert,WSC, p. 221.
90 French, ‘Origins’, p. 214.
91 Ibid., pp. 215–16.
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his testimony at the Dardanelles Commission. Churchill had argued that
once the British ﬂeet broke through the defences of the Dardanelles ‘a
daily shelling of a moderate character at stated intervals, with parleys
and bargaining’ would have eventually caused ‘the enemies of the Young
Turks to unite, overthrow them and make peace’.92 French argued that
‘Churchill’s belief that this would have happened had the ﬂeet got through
rested little more on his conviction of the innate inferiority and poor
ﬁghting qualities of non-European troops’.93
But this overlooks the notion that Churchill may have considered
that those friendly to the British such as Djavid Bey, Ahmed Djemal
Pasha and others could lead a coup against the pro-German contingent
or that even Enver himself could be convinced to leave the Central
Powers alliance. This was a serious possibility in Churchill’s mind. On
19 March 1915, Churchill spoke with Captain William Hall, the director
of Naval Intelligence, regarding intelligence from Constantinople. He
informed Churchill that he had been in negotiations with Talaat Bey, the
Turkish minister of the interior. According to Hall, Talaat said: ‘Many of
[Constantinople’s] most inﬂuential citizens would welcome an immediate
break with the Germans and prayers were even being offered up at
mosques of the city for the arrival of the British ﬂeet.’94
There were other factors which belie an ‘orientalist motive’ behind the
creation of the Dardanelles offensive. The ﬁrst was that a precedent had
already been laid for such an operation. Arthur Marder pointed out that
the real root of the operation lay in the previous plans drawn up by the
CID (Committee of Imperial Defence) in 1906 in case war had arisen with
Turkey over the Sinai boundary dispute.95 Though the plans included a
joint attack and not a strictly naval operation, they did lay the ground
work for such an operation.
Another factor which points away from an ‘orientalist motive’ was the
two initial military actions taken against Turkey: the Indian government’s
force landed at Fao and the cutting of Turkish railway lines to Alexandria
by the British navy. The latter played a large role in the Cabinet’s
estimation of the Ottoman empire’s ability to wage war, because Turkish
authorities almost immediately surrendered under ﬁre from the British
navy and agreed to destroy their own trains. This indicates that the
opinion of Turkish military inferiority was derived, at least in part, from
their initial military blunders, rather than some preconceived notion
of racial inferiority. Gilbert reinforces this point, by noting that this
event ‘appeared proof that the Turks were not serious opponents and
encouraged the hope that no great military effort would be needed to force
92 See Dardanelles Commission of Inquiry: Statement by Churchill, 19 Sept. 1916 CHAR 2/79/1;
French, ‘Origins’, p. 219.
93 French, ‘Origins’, p. 219.
94 William Hall to Churchill, 19 March 1915, Gilbert,WSC, p. 359.
95 Arthur Marder, From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, II (London, 1965), p. 199.
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Turkey out of the war’.96 Churchill’s own testimony in the Dardanelles
Commission stated that:
The incident [was] not without signiﬁcance, because it had helped to form
the opinion in our mind as to the degree of resistance which might in all
circumstances be expected from Turkey. What kind of Turk was this we
were ﬁghting? . . . I must say that it was always in my mind that we were
not dealing with a thoroughly efficient military power, and that it was quite
possible that we could get into parley with them.97
The third major factor affecting the decision to open an attack on
the Dardanelles, which French largely ignores, stemmed from strategic
necessity. Though Churchill wanted his attack on the Dardanelles and
Gallipoli more and more, there were no troops to help him realize his
ambitions. However, the situation in the east was deteriorating, with
Russia appealing for a distraction for the Turks to ease its position in the
Caucasus.
Upon learning of the Russian appeal, Grey sent a letter to Kitchener
and Churchill asking if a ‘naval action would be able to prevent
the Turks sending more men into the Caucasus and thus denuding
Constantinople’.98 A combination of several expert opinions, including
Hankey and Kitchener himself, pushed for an attack at the Dardanelles.
It was in this climate that Churchill and Kitchener opted for a purely
naval operation due to a coupling of the poor showing of Turkish tactics
outside of Alexandria and because of strategic requirement to alleviate the
Russians, not because of the ‘conviction held by most Englishmen that
the Turk was inherently inferior to the white man’.99 Though this may
have played some role in the early thinking of many of the War Cabinet
members, it has been overstated.
Churchill sent a telegram to Vice-Admiral Carden asking whether
‘forcing the Dardanelles by ships alone was a practical option’.100 Carden
acquiesced to Churchill’s wishes, noting that: ‘They might be forced by
extended operations with a large number of ships.’101 Seeking glory for
himself and the navy that he commanded, Churchill was quick to adopt
the plan, with the blessing of Kitchener and Admirals Jackson and Oliver.
However, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Jacky Fisher, unfalteringly believed
an expeditionary force was required to take the Gallipoli peninsula.
Asquith too was opposed to such a scheme. He wrote to Venetia
Stanley on 5 December 1914 regarding Churchill’s plan, stating that: ‘His
violent mind is at present set on Turkey and Bulgaria and he wants to
96 Gilbert,WSC, p. 222.
97 Winston Churchill, statement for the Dardanelles Commission; Gilbert, WSC,C,
III, pt 2, pp. 1568–71.
98 Ibid., p. 232.
99 French, ‘Origins’, p. 212.
100 Churchill to Admiral Carden Gilbert,WSC, p. 234.
101 Admiral Carden to Winston Churchill,WSC,C, III, pt 2, p. 380.
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organize a heroic adventure against Gallipoli and the Dardanelles; to
which I am altogether opposed.’102
It is easy to understand why Churchill was apt to adopt Carden’s plan.
Such a naval victory would redeem Churchill’s earlier failure at Antwerp,
demonstrate British naval superiority, reduce the number of casualties,
and perhaps aid in bringing an end to the war in Europe.103 Another
factor that played a role in Churchill’s willingness to jump at an all-naval
operation on the Dardanelles was his previous interest in such operations.
This interest was visible as early as 1900 when Churchill’s ﬁction Savrola
(1900) was published. The last act of this novel ends with what Churchill
would later call in his bookMy Early Life, ‘an ironclad ﬂeet forcing a sort
of Dardanelles to quell the rebellious capital’.104
Assuming victory, Churchill and the Admiralty laid out a principally
benevolent policy that concluded with the assertion that ‘all religious
buildings, especially mosques, and objects venerated by Moslems will be
treatedwith the utmost respect’.105 Gilbert insinuates that Churchill added
this declaration as a warning to Kitchener following his destruction of the
Mahdi’s tomb in Sudan. However, such statements could have risen from
Churchill’s fear of angering BritishMuslim subjects and to prevent a pan-
Islamic movement. Certainly this fear was increasing in Churchill, whose
personal notes from early January 1915 contend:
It is in Asia that a natural and appropriate sphere [of] action will be formed
for the unorganized armies of Turkey, where the weight of Islam will be
drawn into the struggle on theGerman side. TheMohammedan inﬂuence in
Asiawill carrywith it all kindred forces along inEgypt and along theNorth-
African shore. It is in Asia, through Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan,
and ultimately India that England will be struck at and her crown of
acquisitions cancelled out. India is the target, Islam is the propellant, and
the Turk is the projectile.106
Churchill was not the only minister who wanted be aligned with
Muslim sympathies after the defeat of the Ottoman empire. At a War
Council meeting on 19 March 1915, Sir Edward Grey wanted to set
up an ‘independent Moslem State in the Arab provinces of the Turkish
Empire’.107 There was, however, still a great deal of disagreement among
the various departments as to what should be done in the Middle East
once theOttoman empire fell. For instance, LewisHarcourt, the Secretary
of State for the Colonies, believed that Mesopotamia should become ‘an
outlet for Indian immigration and suggested offering the Holy Places as
a mandate to the United States’.108 At the same meeting, Kitchener and
102 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 5 Dec. 1914, in Brock, Asquith, p. 327.
103 The siege of Antwerp in 1914 represented a signiﬁcant loss for the British navy. See Richard
Hough, The Great War at Sea: 1914–18 (Oxford, 1983).
104 Churchill,My Early Life, p. 154.
105 Ibid., p. 327.
106 Winston Churchill, personal notes, Jan. 1916, CHAR/ 2/71/6–9.
107 Gilbert,WSC, p. 355.
108 Ibid., p. 373.
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Crewe argued to ‘transfer Mecca, the centre of the Islamic world from
Turkish to British control, rather than let the Turkish Empire remain
intact and thereby make it possible for the Holy Lands of Islam to fall
under Russian domination’.109 Churchill also sought to determine the
fate of the Ottoman empire and threw himself into the War Council’s
partitionist campaign. In a War Council meeting on 19 March 1915
Churchill indicated that he thought that Britain ‘did not intend to leave
this inefficient and out-of-date nation [Turkey], which had long misruled
one of the most fertile countries in the world [i.e. Mesopotamia], still in
its possession!’ He further said that ‘Turkey had long shown herself to be
inefficient as a governing Power and it was time for us to make a clean
sweep’.110
This reversed what Churchill had originally thought regarding the
Turkish role in the world after the war. This reversal of his opinion has
even baffled Gilbert, who wrote: ‘These extreme sentiments were in direct
and violent contrast to Churchill’s earlier sympathies for the Young Turks
and their revolution.’111 These particular minutes have led some historians
such as Trumbull Higgins andDavid French to suggest that Churchill was
merely a ‘Turko-phobe’,112 and that he ‘believed in the innate inferiority of
Asiatic troops’.113 However, these conclusions ignored Churchill’s earlier
attempts to keep Turkey as a British ally and ignored Churchill’s personal
relationship with members of the Young Turks. It may be as likely that
Churchill simply felt personally affronted by Enver and the other Turks
who sided against him.
Despite Churchill’s blueprint for victory, and at the behest of Kitchener
and Fisher, the War Council decided to send a small battalion of land
troops. This decision proved fatal to the execution of the Mediterranean
offensive, leaving the expeditionary force outmanned, unsupplied and
unable to assist the naval assaults, which were being repelled by the
Turkish forts on the Dardanelle straits. Kitchener, who had originally
called for troops, ‘would not release his last regular division, the Twenty-
ninth’, for fear of their requirement in France.114 Churchill realized that
without British regulars the offensive push would fail against their ﬁerce
foe. Churchill was furious and tried to intervene at aWar Council meeting
on 26 February 1915. He said that ‘the 29th Division would not make
the difference between failure and success in France, but might well make
the difference in the East’. He said he wanted the record to reﬂect that
‘he dissented altogether from the retention of the 29th Division in this
109 Ibid., p. 355.
110 Winston Churchill, 19 March 1915, War Council Meeting Minutes, in Gilbert,WSC,C, III, pt 1,
pp. 715–16.
111 Gilbert,WSC, p. 356.
112 Trumbull Higgins,Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles (London, 1963), p. 43.
113 French, ‘Origins’, p. 220.
114 RaymondCallahan, ‘What about the Dardanelles?’,The AmericanHistorical Review, 78/3 (1973),
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country. If a disaster occurred in Turkey owing to the insufficiency of
troops, he must disclaim all responsibility’.115
As it became apparent that Churchill’s scheme to take the Dardanelles
and Gallipoli was failing, Churchill became more depressed. After being
asked to resign from the Admiralty and appointed Chancellor of the
Duchy of Lancaster under the coalition government, on 14 August 1915
he spent some time with his old friend Wilfrid. S. Blunt. Blunt believed
that ‘Churchill might gomad’ and noted that while Churchill sat painting,
he said that ‘there is more blood than paint on these hands . . . All those
thousands ofmen killed.We thought it would be a little job and so itmight
have been if it had been done the right way.’116
Churchill’s statement of a ‘little job’ illustrated his frustration with the
eastern front and could easily be interpreted as a dismissive imperialist
remark. However, it could just as easily be understood as frustration
with how the front was waged and the fact there was a front there at
all. It must be remembered that Churchill believed until the very end
that Turkish neutrality was a possibility and that he personally knew the
Turkish leadership, of which he reminded his readers in TheWorld Crisis:
The Aftermath (1929).117
After the war, Churchill’s view on Turkey changed yet again. As
Minster of War and as Colonial Secretary, Churchill maintained a
relatively positive view of Turkey. His Cabinet memorandum of 7 June
1920 strongly criticized the Treaty of Se`vres, which awarded Thrace and
Smyrna to Greece, as unjust and noted that it was unenforceable, because
it ‘would condemn to anarchy and barbarism for an indeﬁnite period
the greater part of the Turkish Empire’.118 One of Churchill’s reasons for
seeing the Treaty of Se`vres as unenforceable was because the only army
that could enforce it, owing to commitments in Europe and cost, was
the Greek army. Churchill argued that this meant, ‘it was not Britain
and India and Allenby that they had to endure and for a time obey, but
Greece the hated and despised of generations’.119 While Churchill warned
of the perils of the Treaty, Lloyd George welcomed the ramiﬁcations of
Se`vres. He saw it as a moment in which Greece could help ultimately
cripple Turkey while simultaneously realizing the ‘Megali Idea’ or the
Greek nationalist idea that a Greek state should encompass all regions
inhabited by ethnically Greek people.120
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However, this balance of power shifted rapidly in early September 1922,
after the Turkish Nationalists defeated the Greeks, reclaimed Smyrna,
and began marching toward Chanak with the intention of forcing the
occupying forces out of Turkey and reclaiming Constantinople. On
their march the Turkish Nationalists encountered the British garrison
at Chanak and a standoff ensued. Lloyd George and the Cabinet issued
harsh ultimatums threatening war if the Nationalists continued, but their
leader Mustapha Kemal (Atatu¨rk) refused to yield. Though Churchill
was initially reluctant, he agreed to acquiesce with Lloyd George’s view
that Turkey should be kept out of Europe in a Cabinet meeting on 15
September.121 The next day they released a press communique´ which
implied that France, the dominions and the Balkan states were all as
resolute as Lloyd George and Churchill to halt the Turkish Nationalists.
It was released to the press before any external powers were made aware of
it and its aggressive tone alienated the British public, who were still reeling
from the First World War.
Churchill’s reversal on his Turkish position shocked his colleagues.
Lord Beaverbrook was ‘astonished to ﬁnd Churchill . . . in complete
agreement with the Prime Minister’s Near East Policy’.122 Sir Maurice
Hankey, Lloyd George’s Cabinet Secretary, recorded that he thought
Churchill, who had been ‘a strong Turko-phile had swung round’ and
that he was now ‘violently Turko-phobe and even phil-Hellenic’.123 Hewas
aware that such a sharp turn would need an explanation in his memoirs,
The World Crisis (1929), saying:
So having done my utmost for three years to procure a friendly peace
with Mustapha Kemal and the withdrawal of the Greeks from Asia Minor,
and having consistently opposed my friend the Prime Minister upon this
issue, I now found myself whole-heartedly upon his side in resisting the
consequences of the policy I had condemned.124
It is unclear why Churchill changed his mind on Turkey during that
Cabinet meeting but certainly one major factor was his knowledge of
the Armenian massacres which had been perpetrated by the Turks.125
Gilbert wrote that Churchill ‘had been shocked by the Turkish slaughter
of Armenians throughout 1921’.126 Indeed, Churchill was circulating
memoranda on the dangers to Armenia as early as August 1919,127 and
in his memoirs he noted that news of Turkish atrocities committed on
Greek and Armenian Christians ‘appeared daily’.128 This combined with
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Churchill’s watchful eye on public opinion and his inclination towards
action, probably made his switch to Lloyd George’s position relatively
simple, despite the years he had put in working to a more sympathetic
resolution with Turkey. But Churchill and Lloyd George misread public
opinion. Their unwavering stance against the Turks was viewed as
irresponsible by political colleagues and the press alike, because it ‘gave
the impression of being anxious to provoke another war’.129 The Times
accused the Cabinet of being: ‘Rash and vacillating and incapable.’130 This
opinion was echoed in the Daily Mail and several other national papers.
As a result Churchill’s support of Lloyd George’s anti-Turk position
backﬁred and destroyed the Coalition government in October 1922, one
month prior to the dissolution of the Sultanate in Turkey. Winston
Churchill never stood as a Liberal again.
Ultimately, Churchill had a much more complex, if not sympathetic,
relationship with the Ottoman empire than is typically understood.
The orientalist views of his youth quickly evaporated amidst his desire
for adventure and the ever-present Conservative view of the Ottoman
empire as an ally. Undoubtedly, Churchill’s views of the Ottoman empire
oscillated from a sympathetic disposition, during his soldiering years, to
outright disdain during the First World War. His dynamic relationship
was built on Conservative party, geopolitics as well as Liberal aspirations
for Europe.While Churchill’s views of the Ottoman empire were informed
by his political party, they were not dominated by it. As a Conservative,
Churchill criticized Salisbury’s placation of the Ottomans and as a
Liberal Churchill strived to create British Ottoman alliances, even when
it was politically unpopular. This must be balanced with his decision to
requisition the Turkish ships in 1914 and to stand with Lloyd George on
the Chanak Crisis. Despite these inconsistencies Churchill’s desire to ﬁnd
and realize a ‘great Turkish policy’ was a major component of his world-
view prior to the FirstWorldWar and afterwards hemaintained a positive
view of Turco-British relations.
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